

# **Training Proposal for UE x Command Posts**

**A Monograph  
by  
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## **Abstract**

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The Army Chief of Staff has determined that the United States Army needs to have more modular and robustly manned headquarters elements. General Peter J. Schoomaker identified some deficiencies with the current Force XXI divisional headquarters structure. The Army Campaign Plan (ACP) addresses these deficiencies by directing the modular conversion of the Army's ten active divisions into Unit of Employment (UE-x) formations. This directive provides guidance for divisional leadership to maintain a trained and cohesive battle staff while expediting significant changes in personnel assigned, organization and function.

This paper examines how to train the UE-x battle staff to rapidly integrate into a cohesive team under its current operating conditions. This examination focuses on the cohesion of the junior field grades officers (Majors) assigned to a UE-x battle staff. Areas of analysis include identification of UE-x training challenges, training implications associated with the UE-x design and selective DOTMLP-F recommendations.

In course of the analysis, the study determines the need for a comprehensive training program for the UE-x battle staff. Therefore, it concludes by presenting a proposal advocating the modification of manning management of the command posts, more connectivity with Army MEL 4 schools, and a certification process for officers assigned to the UE-x.

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## CHAPTER ONE

### INTRODUCTION

The transformation of our headquarters will be even more dramatic than that of our units, for we will sever the routine association between headquarters and the units they control. At division level and higher, headquarters will surrender organic subordinate formations, becoming themselves streamlined modular organizations capable of commanding and controlling any combination of capabilities—Army, joint, or coalition.<sup>1</sup>

General Peter J. Schoomaker, Army Chief of Staff

The Army Chief of Staff has determined that the United States Army needs to have more modular and robustly manned headquarters elements. In a joint article with Acting Secretary of the Army Les Brownlee, General Peter J. Schoomaker identifies three major deficiencies with the current legacy divisional headquarters structure. These liabilities include: 1) Typically, once a division headquarters is committed to an operation, it requires augmentation in both personnel and equipment to meet operational needs. 2) The ad hoc nature of the command posts degrades the overall deployability and potential effectiveness of the division headquarters; additionally it also restricts the division's ability to minimize its command and control footprint. 3) Not enough organic joint interfaces are present in the division headquarters to facilitate the ability for the division to serve as an Army Service Component Command or Joint Task Force headquarters.<sup>2</sup>

The Army Campaign Plan (ACP), dated 12 April 2004, addresses these liabilities by directing the modular conversion of the Army's ten active divisions into Unit of Employment (UE-x) formations. Scheduled to be complete by fiscal year 2007, this directive provides guidance for divisional leadership to maintain a trained and cohesive battle staff while expediting significant changes in personnel assigned, organization, and function. This demand is also influenced by a compressed and ever-changing schedule due to the Global War on Terrorism (GWOT) and new manning stabilization policies included in the ACP.

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<sup>1</sup> Les Brownlee, Acting Secretary of the Army and General Peter J. Schoomaker, Army Chief of Staff. "Serving a Nation at War: A Campaign Quality Army with Joint Expeditionary Capabilities." *Parameters*. Summer, 2004 14-15.

<sup>2</sup> Ibid, 15.

## The Research Question

This study identifies considerations to enable the UE-x battle staff to expeditiously become more effective and efficient within its operational life cycle. This paper considers that time available for training and its utilization for the UE-x battle staff becomes even more important within the constructs of the ACP. Therefore, the research question for this monograph is “how to train the UE-x battle staff to rapidly integrate into a cohesive team under its current operating conditions?” This examination focuses on the cohesion of the junior field grade officers (Majors) assigned to a UE-x battle staff. This is based on the assessment that officers at this grade conduct the majority of the work of a staff operating at the high tactical level and the assumption that, by increasing the cohesion of this group, the cohesion of the entire battle staff increases as well.

## Organization

This study focuses on three areas: identifying the challenges in training a UE-x, examining training implications within the organization design of the UE-x and legacy division command posts, and providing selected doctrine, organization, training, material, leader development, personnel, and facilities (DOTMLP-F) recommendations for a UE-x command post training program. The selected DOTMLP-F areas include organization, training, leader development, and personnel. First, this monograph reviews the training challenges faced by new UE-x command posts. This step explores the course of action created by the Army Campaign Plan and its interaction with the U.S. Army’s operational environment. Subsequently, this step explains the nature and challenges of modular headquarters operating within a one-year management lifecycle of Army Force Generation (ARFORGEN).<sup>3</sup> Additionally, based on a recommendation from a *Parameters*’ article, this monograph examines how the U.S. Marine

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<sup>3</sup> Department of the Army, “Army Campaign Plan” with change 1, Washington, D.C., 27 October 2004; Annex F

Corps maintains cohesive Marine Expeditionary Unit (MEU) and Brigade (MEB) headquarters to identify any insights that can be applied to the UE-x command posts.<sup>4</sup> Second, this study examines some training implications for the UE-x. By providing how the UE-x command posts differ from function and structure of the legacy division C2 structure, the comparison identifies areas that need emphasis in an evolving training program. Lastly, this monograph makes recommendations, based on the above analysis, for training implications for division staffs in becoming functional UE-x staffs. As required, some selected DOTMLP-F analysis reinforces these proposals.

## **Methodology**

First, this paper identifies a group of training challenges derived from both the Army Campaign Plan and one of the deficiencies from the Army's Chief of Staff mandates for headquarters elements. Second, the study details a range of training implications for the UE-x leadership to consider before developing a comprehensive training program. These implications focus on majors that are slated for or currently assigned to a UE-x battle staff. Finally, this paper applies the insights from comparing challenges and implications to a training program proposal for the UE-x battle staff.

## **Evaluation Criteria**

This paper uses "robust and cohesive manning"<sup>5</sup> as its evaluation criteria. This study defines robust and cohesive manning as the degree to which the UE-x command post training program minimizes the need for augmentation and maximizes assets on hand. This criterion has

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<sup>4</sup> John Gordon IV and Jerry Sollinger, "The Army's Dilemma", *Parameters*. Summer, 2004, 44.

<sup>5</sup> Les Brownlee, Acting Secretary of the Army and General Peter J. Schoomaker, Army Chief of Staff. "Serving a Nation at War: A Campaign Quality Army with Joint Expeditionary Capabilities." *Parameters*. Summer, 2004, 15. In establishing this criterion, this study first considered using all of the Army Chief of Staff's recommendations for UE-x command posts. The attempt to address the combination of joint proficiency, rapid deployability, and robust and cohesive manning would have made this study too broad and generic. However, these recommendations may serve as a starting point for identifying additional training implications for the UE-x battle staff.

one sub-component, which is an ad hoc organization. Attempts to prevent the creation of ad hoc organizations remains a critical component in developing cohesion. This concern has received more attention as the CSA regularly comments that ad hoc organizations are one of the major liabilities associated with legacy division command posts.

## Summary

Not since President William McKinley's administration has the U.S. Army faced such a fundamental change in how it organizes and mans its formations.<sup>6</sup> The implementation of the Army Campaign Plan, together with the UE-x conversion for divisional and corps battle staffs, makes a review of the training implications and presenting a possible method to address it a matter of importance to the U.S. Army. This monograph provides such a review and proposal by identifying the training challenges for the UE-x, comparing the UE-x design to the legacy divisions, and presenting training recommendations for the UE-x battle staff.

The next chapter provides a detailed analysis of the training challenges faced by the newly formed UE-x battle staffs. These training challenges range from expectations of battle staff from a legacy division to the overall U.S. Army manning policies. Additionally, the operating environment for the UE-x is filled with questions concerning force stabilization.<sup>7</sup> Issues like creating manpower flexibility for operations in Iraq and Afghanistan, while mitigating constant disruption of personnel moves are steering current debate in how to proceed with

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<sup>6</sup> Richard W. Leopold, *Elihu Root and the Conservative Tradition* (Boston: Little, Brown and Company) 38-41. Leopold explains: From 1899 to 1904, Secretary of War Elihu Root implemented a significant re-organization of the United States Army. Faced with a Filipino Insurgency and occupation duties in newly acquired territories from the Spanish-American War, Secretary Root had three major changes on his agenda. First, Root needed more flexibility in manpower. He accomplished this by obtaining a higher end-strength for the Army while implementing more efficient personnel actions like the elimination of Washington-based permanent staff officers to ensure political acceptability. Second, Root decided that the military education system must reinforce and promote the previously mentioned manpower adjustments. The result was the creation of the Army War College, which allowed the professional education of all officers to compensate for the loss of large and very specialized staffs. Third on Root's list was the overhaul of the national militia system to provide better availability of trained troops during times of crisis. Root's efforts led Congress to establish higher standards for organization of the National Guard.

<sup>7</sup> Lt Col. S. Jamie Gayton, "Have We Finally Found the Manning Holy Grail?" *Military Review*, March-April 2004, 34-37.

division conversion. These issues and others dominate as the key challenges to command post training that need to be addressed.

## CHAPTER TWO

### CHALLENGES IN TRAINING THE UE-x

To truly be successful, transformation must build on those enduring values and rich traditions of the Army. We will keep the best of the past, while transforming to be better able to meet the challenges of the future.<sup>8</sup>

Dr. Francis J. Harvey, Secretary of the Army

The U.S. Army is undergoing an organizational redesign of its legacy division structure to convert to the UE-x formation. This redesign effort, directed in the *Army Campaign Plan*, describes why and how the concept is critical to meet current and future operational requirements. The ACP provides a schedule and prioritized tasks for UE-x conversion but does not provide guidance on post-conversion actions and the actual training of the UE-x.<sup>9</sup> This lack of detail for the UE-x formations possibly suggests that the ACP may have over emphasized the conversion of the brigade combat teams. Regardless if this is the case, implementation of the ACP creates a window of opportunity to redesign the training process for the UE-x battle staff.

With limited direction in how to proceed in training the UE-x battle staff, the UE-x leadership must manage this change by understanding the complexity of its operating environment and identify the training challenges it must resolve. By examining the expectations from the field, the impact of the operating environment, the Army Force Generation program, and the similarity of challenges faced by U.S. Marine Corps Command Elements, this chapter focuses on training processes that may need to change or goals that may need to be adjusted. Taken collectively, these challenges to UE-x training justify the requirement for a review and the development of a training program that can overcome these barriers. The endstate of this analysis

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<sup>8</sup> Dr. Francis J. Harvey, "Secretary of the Army will meet Future Challenges", Remarks at his welcome ceremony, Ft. Myer, VA, 6 December 2004.

<sup>9</sup> Department of the Army, *The Army Campaign Plan with Change 1*, Washington, DC, GPO: 27 October 2004, Annex F, 1-3.

is to recognize the challenges that interfere with the stated goal of robust and cohesive manning for the UE-x command posts.

## **Expectations from the Field**

Division leadership's expectations of the incoming battle staff officer remains one of top training challenges for command posts. The overall issue is how to quickly integrate and train the team that comprises the battle staff. One common approach from a legacy division battle staff is that majors "within weeks of graduating from the School of Advanced Military Studies (SAMS) and the Command and General Staff College (CGSC) are thrown together and expected to perform at a high level of proficiency".<sup>10</sup>

Success in using this approach is dependent on three factors. First, the ability to train during the summer transition cycle is critical. Currently, the time available between transition and deployment can range from three months to one year. An incoming battle staff officer must quickly absorb lessons learned from the incumbent battle staff. If this is not accomplished during the summer transition, the incoming battle staff officer's level of proficiency may remain in flux throughout his or her tour.

Second, team cohesion is developed by random chance. The ad hoc nature of throwing the team together, once the battle staff officer arrives to the headquarters, may expose the leadership to too many variables to count on cohesion as an initial battlefield multiplier for the

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<sup>10</sup> Department of the Army, 3<sup>rd</sup> Infantry Division (Mechanized) After Action Report: Operation IRAQI FREEDOM, Ft. Stewart, Georgia, July 2003, Pg 94. One observation suggests that the rapid integration of the battle staff into a coherent team that is capable of conducting a detailed analysis of a higher plan and producing a written operations order is essential to the long term effectiveness of the battle staff. Within weeks of graduating from the School of Advanced Military Studies (SAMS) and the Command and General Staff College (CGSC), the many members of the battle staff are thrown together and expected to perform at a high level of proficiency. The development of the team shortly after its formation in June or July each year is critical to its ability to adapt rapidly and adjust to the changing situation and to develop and facilitate the products needed to keep the command group informed during the decision-making process. The report's recommendation was the development of the battle staff into a functioning team needs to be a priority in early summer and is critical to their success later in the year. Incoming and outgoing should review and practice TACSOPs and SOPs. The incoming battle staff must be familiar with the division's preferences of briefings to the command group and orders process.

UE-x. To compensate, many chief of staffs seek previously known officers from past assignments to fill their battle staffs.

Third, the complexity of tasks assigned to the headquarters is adjusted to its experience level. For example, the initial training period of incoming officers is usually focused on gaining familiarity with the tactical (TACSOP) and garrison standard operating procedures of the headquarters.<sup>11</sup> With the TASCOP developed around the division's METL, this means that the division staff, until it is able to work together as team for more than two to three months, should reasonably expect to be assigned tasks only relating to its METL.

Over the past twenty years, this approach has worked effectively but inefficiently as it has depended on the need for augmentation when tasks get too complex.<sup>12</sup> With modularity and the ever-increasing complexity on the battlefield, it is important to train emphasizing both elements. The U.S. Army can no longer continue to accept risk in its ability to rapidly integrate and build a cohesive command post.

## **The Impact of the Operating Environment on the UE-x CP Conversion**

As articulated in the *Army Campaign Plan*, the conversion of divisions to Units of Employment is a priority for the Army in order to create a campaign-capable joint and expeditionary force. Over the next six years, the Army plans to continue to train and rotate forces to support current operations like OPERATION ENDURING FREEDOM (OEF) and OPERATION IRAQI FREEDOM (OIF) while simultaneously building more ready, agile, and versatile formations and headquarters optimized for joint operations.<sup>13</sup>

The demanding sequence of re-deploying from operations, rest and refit, training, certification and deployment back to operations occurs in the timespan of approximately one year. This requires the UE-x leadership to develop and implement focused, but flexible training

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<sup>11</sup> Ibid, 94.

<sup>12</sup> LTC Billy J. Jordan and Mark J. Reardon, USA, "Restructuring the Division: An Operational and Organization Approach", *Parameters*, May-June 1998, 28.

<sup>13</sup> U.S. Department of the Army, *Army Campaign Plan*. Washington, D.C.: 12 April 2004.

plans for its organic and assigned organizations. The UE-x battle staffs must be able to leverage this time period as their command posts will continue to function on a one-year cycle for the foreseeable future.

Time is not the only challenge for a UE-x conversion. The availability of personnel and equipment to fully field the UE-x command posts has become an increasing concern for the UE-x commander. The U.S. Army personnel branches are reporting approximately a thirty percent officer shortage in the grades of branch-qualified captains and above because of rapid transformation and expansion of number of Brigade Combat Teams (BCTs).<sup>14</sup> Equipment for the UE-x formation is also an issue. The U.S. Army Staff's G8 Force Development Office has identified a significant shortage of command and control communications equipment for the BCT and the UE-x formations. In fact, the shortage is so severe that the likely course of action to address this shortfall is to push down equipment and funds designated for the Future Combat System (FCS) to the UE-x formations and BCTs.<sup>15</sup>

Overall, continued shortages in time, personnel and equipment constrain a template approach to UE-x conversion<sup>16</sup> and have significant effects on training. Developing a training plan to foster a cohesion command post with the lack of qualified personnel, equipment to communicate, and training enablers to maximize time available demands unusual creativity to succeed. Even with UE-x conversion, the key challenge remains the same in the U.S. Army's

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<sup>14</sup> From the Infantry Senior Leader Update given by LTC Lee Fetterman, U.S. Army Infantry Branch Assignments Office, June 2004.


<sup>15</sup> Andrew Feickert, U.S. Army's Modular Redesign: Issues for Congress. Washington, D.C.: Congressional Research Service, July 19, 2004, 17-18.

<sup>16</sup> MG David P Valcourt, "Army and FA Transition", *Field Artillery Journal*, September-October 2004, 1-3. The demands of OEF and OIF are changing the acceptable level or standard for the completion of UE-x conversion. Initially, the 3d Infantry Division was to serve as the benchmark of what can be reasonably accomplished within the given tempo of ongoing operations and troop rotations. Even with the priority of most of the Army's material activities, 3<sup>rd</sup> ID could not finish its conversion tasks and address the training and material requirements of the specialty brigades and the UE-x itself. The Army therefore told 3<sup>rd</sup> ID to deploy to Iraq as a hybrid division, not a UE-x. With three divisions tentatively converted, the focus has now shifted to 4<sup>th</sup> Infantry Division. This formation has benefited from the other division's lessons learned and is able to work on fielding issues with some of the first specialty brigades, like fires and training the UE-x.

operational environment. Success depends on the battle staff's ability to do more with fewer resources.

## Army Force Generation (ARFORGEN)

Given transformation's focus is on the Brigade Combat Teams, the Army's concept for creation and maintaining rapidly deployable forces, known as ARFORGEN, might be a poor fit for the UE-x command posts. The concept provides no guidance on how to organize and train the division staffs to convert to the UE-x and integrate its new command posts into a respective readiness cycle.<sup>17</sup> The effect has created some confusion over command relationships in the training cycles for the UE-x CPs and their subordinate Brigade Combat Teams.



**Figure 1: The Army Force Generation Model<sup>18</sup>**

This model is dependent on future OIF and OEF rotations being more stabilized and predictable. ARFORGEN is a thirty-six month life cycle management process that directs the projected forty-three to forty-eight BCTs to divide into three stages of operations: Reset/Train,


<sup>17</sup> Department of the Army, *The Army Campaign Plan with Change 1*, Washington, DC, GPO: 27 October 2004, Annex F, 1-3.

<sup>18</sup> Ibid, 2.

Ready, and Available. Roughly eleven to sixteen BCTs assume and perform the yearly requirements earmarked for each stage. Simultaneously, Army policies geared to personnel stabilization, training and education, and force modification conform to support ARFORGEN timeline.<sup>19</sup>

For the present division headquarters elements and eventually UE-x CPs, the ARFORGEN does not quite fit. If the UE-x formations try to conform to the published plan, it may generate some self-induced operational limitations. First, the immediate availability of headquarters during the Reset/Training cycle creates a problem, as only three divisional level staffs are available for operations in a given year. Clearly, this readiness status fails to meet the demands of GWOT. Second, ARFORGEN lacks acknowledgement for non-BCT type organizations. If a training conflict arose between a UE-x and a BCT cycle, the program defaults to the needs of the BCT and would reshuffle the UE-x into a new training cycle.

Since ARFORGEN is practically unacceptable for the UE-x, the Army Chief of Staff identified an informal lifecycle that has come to the forefront as the more reasonable approach to use for all non-BCT type units.<sup>20</sup> Called the cyclic method, this concept uses a one-year management cycle. Divided into two phases, Sustain and Ready, a UE-x headquarters has roughly two to three months to refit and train to maintain nine to ten months of readiness. The length of the sustain period is a concern because the cyclic management cycle reduces training time available for the UE-x command posts from one year (ARFORGEN) to two to three months.



**Figure 2: 1-Year Cyclic Method<sup>21</sup>**

<sup>19</sup> Ibid, 1-3.

<sup>20</sup> General Peter J. Schoomaker, "U.S. Army: The Way Ahead Briefing", Army News, 24 November 2003, 2.

<sup>21</sup> Ibid, 4.

Advantages of the cyclic method are improvements in headquarters cohesion, overall readiness, and less turbulence for assigned battle staff personnel. The UE-x have to centrally manage the personnel turnover to correspond with its BCTs' train/refit period in order to support career development and progression of assigned personnel. The biggest disadvantage of the cyclic method is that the synchronization of the Sustain period is a challenging and complex process.<sup>22</sup> This challenge is exacerbated if the brigade combat teams frequently change alignment to other UE-x formations.

Insights from these two methods suggest that the ARFORGEN will be difficult due to the imbalance between the Army's end-strength and the current pace of global operations. These conditions may limit such a stabilization concept to take effect. However, the Department of the Army has determined ARFORGEN is worth continued implementation as selected BCTs are currently operating in accordance with these force management cycles.<sup>23</sup>

In review, the key elements of ARFORGEN's force stabilization policies create a significant challenge in training the UE-x. By having subordinate BCTs on a planned thirty-six month lifecycle and the UE-x on a one-year cyclic management process creates two significant training problems. First, training priority will more likely remain with the BCT's battle staff compared to the UE-x battle staff. This is not unique, however the new differences in the level of priority can create even more friction points than normal between the staffs and might limit how effective they work together. Second, garrison training opportunities for the UE-x battle staff on command and control techniques with subordinate BCTs may be limited in the foreseeable future. Since modularity and ARFORGEN suggest interchangeability of BCTs for assignment to UE-x formations, a requirement for centralized training management may require a higher headquarters, like FORSCOM, to manage the cycles of the BCTs. Even though interim UE-x doctrine states that the UE-x commander is still ultimately responsible for readiness and training.

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<sup>22</sup> Ibid, 2

<sup>23</sup> Donald E. Vandergriff, "A Year of Reform", Internet, Military.com, 5 January 2004.

This shift of responsibility will essentially take UE-x battle staff out of the consuming business of legacy division activities like training and de-confliction, resource allocation, and readiness management.<sup>24</sup> ARFORGEN produces an opportunity for the UE-x commander to devote more attention in developing his battle staff.

## **The Similarity of Challenges faced by U.S. Marine Command Elements**

The Marine Expeditionary Brigade (MEB) and Unit (MEU) Command Elements share similar practices and training challenges with the UE-x command posts.<sup>25</sup> In recognition that the Marine Corps has some experience in dealing with these challenges, it may be beneficial to review some of their proven ideas in training. The Marines' expeditionary structure leverages several desirable features in their headquarters that the Army is incorporating. These include flexibility, modular formations, joint interoperability, deployability, an expeditionary mindset, and capabilities to operate in dispersed, non-contiguous battle spaces. These features correspond with the intent of the Army Chief of Staff.<sup>26</sup>

The U.S.M.C. has been looking at transformation for its Command Element organizations since the early 1990s. The U.S.M.C. established a solid track record of creating effective horizontal modular C2 structures. For example, in the late 1990s, the Corps compressed six standing MEB Headquarters into three and embedded them into the standing

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<sup>24</sup> Department of the Army, TRADOC, The UE-x White Paper version 3.5, 16 July 2004, 81.

<sup>25</sup> John Gordon IV and Jerry Sollinger, "The Army's Dilemma", *Parameters*. Summer, 2004, 44. The Marine Expeditionary Brigade (MEB) is a warfighting organization in the active force structure of the Marine Corps. The MEB is considered the equivalent to an Army Division due to its typical size and composition of its Ground Combat Element (GCE) and Combat Service Support Element (CSSE). The MEB has a more robust capability in its aviation assets or its Aviation Combat Element (ACE) as the organization has control over fixed and rotary wing aircraft. Normally commanded by a major general, a MEB Command Element (CE) is modular in design as it provides integrated staff, communications platforms, and security elements to enable him to exercise command and control of MEB operations. The Marine Expeditionary Unit (MEU) is the smallest version of modularity within the Marine Corps force structure. With a manning strength of roughly 2,300 marines and a fifteen-day supply operating capacity once committed, the organization is organized, trained, and equipped to handle a wide range of missions. It is comprised of a command element (CE), a reinforced infantry battalion as the GCE, and a reinforced helicopter squadron as the ACE. Like MEB's structure, the CE is a permanent standing C2 unit that includes the commander and his staff, plus specialized detachments, which provide capabilities like naval surface liaison, reconnaissance, communications and electronic warfare.

<sup>26</sup> U.S. Department of the Army, "The Way Ahead", Washington, D.C., GPO: 2004, 1-20.

MEF Command Elements. This move allowed the MEF CEs to have more robust battle staffs and have the capability to echelon command and control along with any MEB or Marine air-ground task force (MAGTF) committed from the MEF into an operation.<sup>27</sup>

The U.S.M.C.'s approach in training their Command Elements is an established program that addresses the tempo, complexity, and the lethality of the present and future battlefield. Marine General Charles C. Krulak reinforces this ideal when he states, "Our approach in training in command and control recognizes and accepts war as a complex, uncertain, disorderly, and time-competitive clash of wills and seeks to provide the commander the best means to win in that environment."<sup>28</sup> With their modular organizational structure and emphasis on joint interoperability, the U.S.M.C has faced less turbulence than the U.S. Army when operational imperatives have made it necessary to alter unit organizational structures.

The U.S. Marines' critical challenge is maintaining teamwork and familiarity within Marine command and control. The service considers it a given that a battle staff will receive quality personnel to man and lead their command elements. The biggest emphasis is placed on cohesiveness of the staff and that there is no substitute for working together prior to deployment.<sup>29</sup> Essentially locked-down for training, a Marine Command Element, whether at the MEU or MEB level, operates on a twelve-month management life cycle. Six months are committed in building rapport and procedure with subordinate elements. The entire headquarters including any specialized sections becomes an integrated and cohesive staff prior to deployment.

## Summary

This chapter identifies the following challenges that will hinder the training environment for the UE-x battle staff. First, the ad hoc approach in developing and training the command

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<sup>27</sup> Lt Col Asad Khan, Lt Col Michael B. West, and Maj Michael H. Brown, "Let's Organize and Train as We Would Fight." *Marine Corps Gazette*, October 2002, 40-46.

<sup>28</sup> Edwin H. Simmons, *The United States Marines* (Annapolis, Maryland: Naval Institute Press, 1998) 195-270.

<sup>29</sup> CPT Stephen R. Shea, "The Case for Retaining the Amphibious MEB Command Element" *Marine Corps Gazette*, August 1992.

posts remains in the legacy divisions. The potential of developing a cohesive team remains strictly by chance rather than a formal process. The recommended fix is the development of a new comprehensive training program that maximizes the UE-x sustain periods. Second, the UE-x conversion is creating some issues in the overall training environment for the battle staff. The demanding army-wide conversion schedule is creating shortages in personnel, equipment and time available. The most prominent and immediate fix is the requirement that leaders in the battle staff must more creative and flexible in application of training. The final challenge is finding a viable process for the UE-x that best interacts with ARFORGEN. The U.S. Army's new stabilization policy has created two separate force management cycles, lifecycle and cyclic. The BCTs will operate on a three-year lifecycle approach, while the UE-x functions in a one-year cyclic approach. The two models create problems for the UE-x in synchronization and interface with subordinate units. It also reduces its training window to roughly two-three months before it has to accept a Ready cycle.

The use of reviewing the Marines' challenges with their command elements had some benefit. The Marines' model provide an example of a command element and its subordinate units operating on one common force management lifecycle. This common lifecycle allows the Marines to lock-down their elements for training. The Marines' challenge remains in maintaining proficient and cohesion teams. The Marines' fix is the use of a battle staff certification process.

These challenges require a comprehensive approach that simultaneously addresses the negative effects of the battle staff's training environment. The next chapter provides further assistance as it presents a design comparison of the command posts from a legacy division and the UE-x. The comparison identifies the training implications of changing the structure of an command post and further assists in the formulation of training program for the UE-x battle staff.

## CHAPTER THREE

### UE x TRAINING IMPLICATIONS ON BUILDING COHESION

The issue is how to imbue the Army's structure—and by extension its doctrine and training—with sufficient flexibility so that it can respond with agility to any and all demands.<sup>30</sup>

RAND Issue Paper IP-195

Identifying and addressing training implications on building cohesion for UE-x command posts is an important task. Cohesion within command and control organizations will make an even greater contribution to battlefield success in the future. It complements improvements associated with organizational structural changes like the UE-x conversion program. Personnel stabilization is the underlining factor in understanding training implications for the UE-x. If the design creates significant personnel turbulence, then cohesion within the battle staff may not reach its full potential.<sup>31</sup>

This chapter examines the organizational design of the UE-x command and control structure. A general background of standard functions, the UE-x design and impacts on cohesion of the command posts represents the bulk of this chapter's analysis. In the course of this analysis, the study relates the training implications of the UE-x design to the feasibility of maintaining a cohesive UE-x battle staff.

#### Standard Functions of Command Posts

FM 71-100 Division Operations states “command posts allow the commander to go where he can best influence actions while maintaining continuity of the overall division operation.”<sup>32</sup> This key characteristic influences command posts to provide flexibility, reliability, and survivability for continuous operations. The standard functions of a division command and

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<sup>30</sup> Thomas McNaughter, David Johnson, and Jerry Soliinger, *Agility by a Different Measure*, Santa Monica, California, RAND, 2000.

<sup>31</sup> Major Brendan B. McBreen, “The Strength of the Wolf is the Pack”, *Marine Corps Gazette*, February 2004, 47.

<sup>32</sup> Department of the Army, FM 71-100, *Division Operations*, Washington, D.C., GPO, 1996,3-4.

control structure are linked in providing this capability. The legacy division C2 structure is divided into a command group and three command posts: Division tactical (TAC CP), Division main (main CP), and Division rear (rear CP).




Figure 3: Legacy Division Command Posts<sup>33</sup>

The command group is the division commander and appointed staff officers that bring some interface capabilities with division assets. Officers from the G2, G3, fire support element and air liaison typically man this organization. A division command group is ad hoc in both function and organization. However, the command group's communication enablers provide a reliable capability for the division commander to fight or maintain situational awareness.

The TAC CP is a mobile command post designed to manage and control the close fight in a division operation. Normally located forward with the lead elements of the division, the TAC CP has a narrow focus and is minimally manned. Traditionally, the assistant division commander for maneuver (ADC-M) leads this organization when it is functioning as lead command control element for the division.

<sup>33</sup> Department of the Army, FM 71-100, *Division Operations*. Washington, D.C. 1996, Figure 3-4 Division CPs.

The main command post is the core element of the division command and control structure. The main CP contains most of battle staff personnel divided into the command cell, G3 and G2 cells. It is both vertically and horizontally integrated with all units in a operation. Headed by the division chief of staff, the main CP performs the planning and allocates resources that allow the other command posts to function properly.

The rear command post has functions similar to both the main and TAC CPs. Its priority of effort is logistics operations within the division. Additionally, the rear CP provides a feasibility check for the main CP to ensure that future plans can be logistically supported. The assistant division commander for support (ADC-S) usually supervises this command post.

These command posts allow the division commander to lead his forces and be responsive throughout the division's area of operations.<sup>34</sup> Even though having limited redundancy, the command posts provide specialized C2 elements with well-defined boundaries that focus its efforts. As a direct result, flexibility within the overall divisional command and structure grows.

Since the days of the Army of Excellence in the 1980s and later refined by Division XXI, this configuration of command posts within a division has been functional, but inefficient.<sup>35</sup> To compensate, training strategies for the command posts commonly stressed the use of technology, like the Army Battle Command System (ABCS), to gain staff efficiencies and consolidate functions. Even with these innovations, the command posts were not fully streamlined for efficiency and continued to depend on augmentation.<sup>36</sup>

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
<sup>34</sup> Department of the Army, FM 71-100, *Division Operations*, Washington, D.C., GPO, 1996, 3-1.

<sup>35</sup> John L. Romjue, *The Army of Excellence: The Development of the 1980s Army*, Fort Monroe, VA: Office of the Command Historian, 1993, 29.

<sup>36</sup> LTC Billy J. Jordan and Mark J. Reardon, USA, "Restructuring the Division: An Operational and Organization Approach", *Parameters*, May-June 1998, 28. For example, if the CPs take an expanded C2 role, like the joint force land component command, which would require augmentation equal to the expanded task.

## The UE-x Command Posts

The UE –x C2 structure is based on a modular design structured around four critical units: the main command post, two tactical command posts (TAC 1 and TAC 2), and a mobile command group (MCG).<sup>37</sup> The design incorporates the Army Chief of Staff’s guidelines. It minimizes need for augmentation, reduces ad hoc task organization, and contains more joint enablers within the command posts.



**Figure 4: UE-x Command Posts**<sup>38</sup>

The structure of these UE-x Command Posts allows the commander to surge or disperse C2 assets according to the requirements of the situation. This approach promotes flexibility in the utilization of the headquarters elements. For example, the main command post can deploy or remain as a sanctuary C2 asset and still be connected to ongoing operations. The two tactical command posts are manned to a level that they have the capacity to handle separate operational

<sup>37</sup> U.S. Department of the Army. U.S. Army White Paper: Unit of Employment (UE-x) Operations. Washington, D.C.: GPO, Version 3.5 16 July 2004, pg 81.

<sup>38</sup> Ibid, 81.

considerations that would normally require the entire divisional command structure to perform. The mobile command group, now a permanent organization, allows the commander to rapidly acquire the pulse of operations. Whether it is by ground or air, the UE-x commander has reliability and redundancy to ensure he stays connected to all other operations within his area of operations.<sup>39</sup>

The command posts retain some similarities with the legacy Division CP design. The main command post is still headed by the Chief of Staff. It also continues to serve as the base for the special staff and any augmented assets like interagency or contractor support. The tactical command posts are headed by one of the deputy commanding generals. The TACs still can rapidly breakdown, move and set-up during operations. Additionally, the TACs maintain the ability to dispatch an early-entry command post to meet a crisis or situation that requires rapid response. The mobile command group has evolved from a team of a helicopter crew and some military police that normally come together based off a mission-tasking sheet to an organic organization. The unit is assigned to the special troops battalion, which allows it to benefit from normal advantages associated to permanent organizations.<sup>40</sup> The special troops battalion completes the UE-x organization. It includes the traditionally assigned headquarters, and headquarters company, the division band, a life-support company, a security company, a signal company and a liaison detachment.<sup>41</sup>

## **How CP Design Changes affect Battle Staff Cohesion**

A modular organizational approach in command and control creates some significant functional changes in building cohesion compared to the current C2 divisional design. These changes in the areas of augmentation, renewal of developmental emphasis on battle staff officers, and the use of liaison elements potentially could generate new battle staff training requirements.

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<sup>39</sup> Ibid, 81.

<sup>40</sup> Ibid, 82-83.

<sup>41</sup> Ibid, 79.

As an adaptive and learning organization, it is critical for the division staff to properly identify this new operating environment as more reliance is placed on teamwork of battle staff to answer the increasing complexity on the battlefield.<sup>42</sup>

## **The Issue of Augmentation**

Building a team for a Division command post traditionally means massive, but short-term, augmentation of personnel and capabilities to its organizational framework. This infusion usually leads to some level of conflict, waste, and inefficiency within the headquarters. As the augmented headquarters begins to rotate or handover responsibility of a campaign to another divisional headquarters, gaps in planning, command post functions, and interoperability tend to develop. These gaps, primarily due to the unfamiliarity to the current situation of a campaign, can have far-reaching implications on the battlefield.<sup>43</sup>

The UE-x CP design does not solve all of the problems associated with building the team, but it addresses the most immediate needs. First, the more robust organic staff allows teamwork within the CP to develop and grow. Second, modularity promotes battle staffs to establish techniques that facilitate the sharing of knowledge. Of course, sharing knowledge is a common practice in the current divisional CPs. However, the new UE-x CP design, in order to be successful, forces more innovated ways of sharing to be developed. This is especially the case for the relationship between TAC 1 and TAC 2. The challenge for the UE-x staff in terms of building a coherent and cohesive team is finding the right mix of size in the manning strength for the CPs compared to the complexity of the operation. With the Army cultural pressures of the rotation of officers from staff to the line, the challenge to maintain competent and homogeneous command posts increases with the UE-x CPs.<sup>44</sup>

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<sup>42</sup> Brigadier General (Ret.) Huba Wass de Czege and Major Jacob Biever, "Optimizing Future Battle Command Technologies" *Military Review*, Mar-Apr 1998, 21-28.

<sup>43</sup> Dietrich Dorner, *The Logic of Failure*. Cambridge, Mass.: Perseus Books, 1996. pg 78-79.

<sup>44</sup> Major Don Vandergriff, USA, "Army Personnel Transformation: Achieving "Parallel Evolution". Briefing to U.S. House of Representatives Armed Services Committee, 10 March 2004.

## Renewal in developing Battle Staff Officers

The modular design of the UE-x formation has the potential to allow the UE-x commander to allocate more attention and mentorship to the development of his or her battle staff. ARFORGEN and similar unit stabilization policies shifts a significant portion of the legacy division commander responsibility of unit readiness down to the BCT commander. Under the interim UE-x doctrine, a force-package designated UE-x commander is no longer burdened on getting brigades ready for a deployment cycle. His primary concern is having a competent and efficient headquarters to receive and transition “ready” BCTs conforming to ARFORGEN cycles. This shift in administrative control has two positive implications for UE-x battle staff.

First, the renewed attention of the commander should reduce the amount of frustration and confusion within the organization. Strong interaction with commander and the battle staff will prevent the command posts from becoming organizations of strangers and reinforce the ability of the C2 element to perform at higher levels of complexity. This improvement can occur if the battle staff has enough time in developing a profound common understanding within its horizontal and vertical cohesion.<sup>45</sup>

As mentioned in the previous chapter, the growing number of inadequately staffed BCT headquarters is placing a drain on the availability of qualified battle staff officers. The UE-x and BCT conversions occurring simultaneously may initiate an informal competition in recruiting and attaining these personnel.<sup>46</sup> If the situation arises, the UE-x should continue have the recruiting advantage as the chance of personal involvement of the commanding general in the selection of future battle staff officers is higher.

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<sup>45</sup> Brigadier General (Ret.) Huba Wass de Czege and Major Jacob Biever, “Optimizing Future Battle Command Technologies” *Military Review*, Mar-Apr 1998, 21-28.

<sup>46</sup> David Potts, *The Big Issue: Command and Control in the Information Age*, London: Strategic and Combat Studies Institute, 2002. pg 126.

## The Use of Liaison Elements

The flow of information within and outside the design is critical. The legacy division CPs depended on higher and subordinate units to provide additional manning for the battle staff and the majority of liaison. Teamwork and good information flow in the command posts can initially suffer as it takes time to develop understanding of standard operating procedures during the conduct of operations. The learning curve is steep among these types of command posts. Problems with the establishment of battle rhythm and a common operating picture, which potentially creates large numbers of redundant reports, can appear for the Division.<sup>47</sup>

The UE-x CP design brings some fixes as it allows the battle staff to build and retain a greater amount of teamwork. Now, the command posts with their organic liaison teams have the designated personnel that are proficient in the duties of passing information and coordination within its C2 structure. Additionally, joint operational planning, coordination and execution with sister services should be more effective and reliable. This is primarily due to the increased joint manning requirements within the design.<sup>48</sup>

## Summary

The chapter identifies and examines the training implications of the UE-x design in building cohesion. Changes from a legacy division to the UE-x design impact augmentation, provide an opportunity to renew attention towards the development of battle staff officers, and the use of liaison elements directly influences how the force is ultimately managed. For the UE-x command posts, these implications create the requirement for a new or modified training approach to ensure battle staff effectiveness.

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<sup>47</sup> David Potts, *The Big Issue: Command and Control in the Information Age*, London: Strategic and Combat Studies Institute, 2002. pg 132.

<sup>48</sup> Department of the Army, TRADOC, The UE-x White Paper version 3.5, Washington, D.C. 16 July 2004, 87. The draft MTOE for the UE-x contains 58 Joint Liaison billets in the formation. As of Jan. 2005, the allocation has been reduced to 8 slots due to sister services' HRCs state that they can not support the intended billets. The UE-x will again rely on augmentation.

Whatever approach is utilized, the UE-x will require a training program that encourages teamwork within and among the command posts. Ideally, future personnel can be identified in a timely manner before assignment to ease the one-year training crunch. The advantage of this approach is that it allows the command posts to be more proficient in deploying, sustaining a robust internal battle rhythm and quickly integrate subordinate BCTs as the units are plugged in the UE-x structure.

Additionally, conversion to the UE-x model produces other requirements that the division staff must address. Policies that affect manning and training should be open for review to facilitate modular functions of the design. Especially, establishing the priority of personnel fill between UE-x staffs and BCT staffs deserves a second look.

#### CHAPTER FOUR


### **UE-x BATTLESTAFF EXPEDITIONARY TRAINING PROGRAM**

As the operational environment, character of the command post structure, and unit expectations change, battle staff training must change to remain relevant. This chapter introduces and explains this monograph's proposal to train the UE-x battle staff to rapidly integrate into a cohesive team. The proposal is called the UE-x Battlestaff Expeditionary Training (UBET) program. UBET builds upon the doctrinal foundation of FM 7-1, *Battle Focused Training*, as it advocates for the tailoring of the roles of the operational, institutional and self-development domains within the Army Training and Leader Development Model (ATLDM).<sup>49</sup> UBET emphasizes the maximum participation for the UE-x CPs in home station training, combat training center (CTC) rotations, joint training exercises, and operational deployments. Additionally, UBET calls for the reconsideration of the education / training balance in all MEL 4 institutions. Finally, UE-x CP manning will be determined based on a robust certification process that stimulates the skill sets, behavior, and experience of assigned staff members.

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<sup>49</sup> Department of the Army, *FM 7-1, Battle Focused Training*. Washington, D.C.: 2003

## UE -x BATTLESTAFF EXPEDITIONARY TRAINING (UBET) PROGRAM



**Figure 5: UBET Program<sup>50</sup>**

A training program for a division level command post must deal with time management issues, personnel transition, especially in key leaders, fielding new technology, and high operation tempo. UBET addresses these concerns by keeping the UE-x CPs focused on training the battle staff on its warfighting skill by expanding its time available. Time is normally considered an inelastic resource<sup>51</sup>, however UBET has a way to give more opportunities for command post training.

### **Institutional Proposal**

UBET proposes that the UE-x battle staff overhaul its relationship with Army MEL4 schools like CGSC and SAMS. By becoming more involved with the school's program of instruction, the UE-x can expect to tailor incoming battle staff officers' learning environment to its formation instead of the individual. First preference to the UE-x in CGSC instruction essentially allocates an additional five to six months to invest into a UE-x battle staff training program.

<sup>50</sup> Ibid, 1.4. Modified figure of the Army Training and Leader Development model for UBET.

<sup>51</sup> Department of the Army FM 71-100, *Division Operations*, Washington, D.C., GPO, 1996, 1-2.

This new learning environment is not intended to stir the ongoing debate of the balance between education and training within a MEL4 institution. However, the price for rapid integration of a UE-x battle staff continues to grow and there is no more time to spare in today's operationally centric force. The only logical option remaining is to tap into the military learning institutions' allocated time period for officer development.

For example, the UE-x White Paper version 3.5 provides the guidance that one TAC will maintain a higher state of readiness than the other CPs within the UE-x.<sup>52</sup> The typical deployment of the command posts includes the ready TAC to take lead while the other CPs augment the lead TAC and monitor the deployment process. As the operation develops, the remaining CPs deploy into theater and assume the command and control responsibilities of the operation. Under the current level of interaction between the UE-x and MEL4 schools, a recently graduated battle staff officer assigned to this command post potentially would have no training lead time to be proficient in his or her duties.

In order to avoid this scenario, UBET suggests that the UE-x should adopt a farm club methodology similar to a professional baseball franchise to guide its relationship with Army MEL4 schools.<sup>53</sup> Applying the farm club model to the CGSC and SAMS appears to be a straightforward process. Once an officer is designated for assignment to a specific UE-x, the individual's learning experience during the second half of the academic school year is designed to lessen the burden of future transition into the UE-x formation.

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<sup>52</sup> Department of the Army, TRADOC, The UE-x White Paper version 3.5, Washington, D.C. 16 July 2004, 83. The combination of command posts allow the UEx commander to rotate readiness and training responsibilities while the UEx is in garrison. Based on joint or Army readiness schedules, one of the two tactical command posts will maintain a higher readiness posture, configuring equipment and personnel into an early entry command post (EECP) package to fit constrained lift, with the other equipment and personnel prepared to follow on. The other TAC supports joint and Army training.

<sup>53</sup> Michael Lewis, *Moneyball*, W.W. Norton & Company: New York, 2003: 119-128. For example, the Oakland A's, the featured major league team in the required SAMS reading *Moneyball*, has the Sacramento River Cats as the AAA affiliate while the Midland Rockhounds are the AA affiliate. These lower teams (AAA, AA) within the organization are designed to grow the skill sets needed and currently used by the management of the major league team. For example, the Rockhounds may be designated to develop players to strive for high on-base percentage instead of power hitting.

This approach forces both the UE-x and the institutional MEL 4 schools to share the responsibility and the monitoring of the time devoted to professional development. However there are advantages to be shared. For CGSC and SAMS, the interaction with the UE-x is another avenue to allow the institutions to keep a pulse on the needs and requirements of the operational force. For the UE-x, it is another tool to eliminate the chance of receiving a non-proficient battle staff officer. In turn, allows the UE-x Chief of Staff to focus training to more complex requirements and formalizes the commander's personalization of their command post arrangements.<sup>54</sup>

CGSC and SAMS role in UBET is to foster an opportunity to build teamwork and theoretically add more training time for UE-x command posts. This can be accomplished by assigning staff groups with designated officers that will be assigned to a UE-x into a notional staff. The staff would operate off the current UE-x SOPs and planning templates by conducting multiple exercises. Additionally, this would provide students an opportunity to interact with UE-x leaders who can influence the priorities and program of instruction of the incoming UE-x staff officers and leaders. The benefit of this approach would be development of strong rapport among the future UE-x Battlestaff and it allows the UE-x to elevate its initial staff-training plan in terms of complexity as the UE-x specifics are covered in the CGSC.

Under CGSC's Intermediate-Level Education (ILE) program, all majors in the Operations career field attend the ten-month resident course. ILE is broken into a three-month common-core course followed by a seven-month Advanced Operations and Warfighting Course (AOWC). The goal of the education is to improve the officers' abilities to conduct full-spectrum

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<sup>54</sup> Brigadier General (Ret.) Huba Wass de Czege and Major Jacob Biever, "Future Battle Command: Where Information Technology, Doctrine and Organization Meet" *AUSA- Army Magazine*, August 2001, 18-22. General Wass de Czege believes that the personalization of division command arrangements is one of the obstacles preventing the develop of the future command post. UBET attempts minimize this concept with a farm system management approach.

operations in joint, interagency, and multinational environments and develop the competencies required to serve successfully as staff officers at UE-x level and above.<sup>55</sup>

UE-x specific training can co-exist with AOWC instruction. The college has already allocated the time and resources to set-up notional staffs and exercises to develop mastery at the land component command, division, and brigade level. The only change that UBET requires is that the college group students based off student's future assignments rather the traditional staff groups during the AOWC studies period. The college can still operate off its team-teaching concept with some minor modifications and provide electives as it normally does.

The AOWC teaching teams will interface with their designated UE-x for the commander's training guidance and familiarity with current SOPs. This requirement will have some growing pains since the teams will abandon their curriculum. They must adapt to support.

## **Operational Proposal**

The second proposal of UBET is a redesign of the operational process of training UE-x level command posts. Traditionally, the primary mechanism of training has remained within the digital realm of the Battle Command Training Program (BCTP) WARFIGHTER (WFX) exercise. Within this capstone exercise, BCTP provides leader development, command and battlestaff training for division and corps level headquarters. It also provides the framework to conduct command and control training from brigade to Army Force/Army Service Component Command/ (ARFOR/ASCC) level operations. BCTP's cadre include a "free thinking" opposing force (OPFOR), certified observer controllers (OCs)/observer trainers (OTs), and senior observers (SROs) as mentors and coaches.<sup>56</sup>

In the past, division command posts would gear up for their BCTP rotation by pulling up temporary augmentation from their subordinate organizations. The augmented battle staff would

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<sup>55</sup> US Army Command and General Staff College, CGSC Circular 350-5, Student Handbook for the Command and General Staff Officer Course, Ft. Leavenworth, KS: July 2003

<sup>56</sup> Department of the Army, TRADOC Regulation 350-50-3, Battle Command Training Program. HQ, TRADOC, Ft. Monroe, VA: September 2002.

attend seminars designed for selected leadership to better understand the BCTP methodology. Once seminars were complete, the division staff would conduct several command post exercises (CPXs) to practice. Once the BCTP rotation was complete, augmented personnel were released and staff principals typically conducted duty assignment transitions. The overall process in participating in a division WFX usually gains a significant of near-term cohesion while losing those gains as quickly as personnel return to normal duty assignments.

Under UBET, BCTP would convert from a digital based Combat Training Center (CTC) to a “dirt” CTC like the National Training Center (NTC) as the UE-x Battlestaff would send a TAC to participate in a training rotation as its capstone event. By having the UE-x TACs play in dirt CTC rotations, the battlestaff would retain long-term dividends by getting realistic training in deployment, integration of forces, and battle command. As a minimum, the UE-x TACs would need to perform the higher command (HICON) role to build familiarity within the battle staff and cohesion with subordinate units.

Current operational trends (OIF/OEF) have forced divisions to seek alternative methods in training their battle staffs. The push for more multi-echelon training advocates sending TACs to CTC rotations. Divisional CPs, under current U.S. Army rotation policy, can expect to be deployed one-year to either OIF or OEF and return for one-year stabilization.<sup>57</sup> Within that stabilized year, the Battlestaff must recover, refit, change out personnel, train, and deploy back to an operation. Considering these facts, a stand-alone BCTP WFX does not fit in the calendar as divisions are racing to get their brigades through certification exercises (CERTEX) and mission rehearsal exercises (MRX). With the constraints of time, limited resources and modularity, divisions have logically identified and focus their efforts in combining their battlestaff’s training with the ongoing CTC MRX schedule.<sup>58</sup>

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<sup>57</sup> Michael E. O’Hanlon, “Rebuilding Iraq and Rebuilding the U.S. Army”, Saban Center Middle East Memo #3, Washington, D.C., June 4, 2004.

<sup>58</sup> Department of the Army, TRADOC, Combat Training Center Directorate, *CTC Rotation Calendar*, Ft. Leavenworth, KS, 3 September 2004.

Constraints are numerous with this proposal. Currently, the CTCs are not designed or resourced in terms of O/C manpower or information infrastructure to handle a UE-x TAC as a player in the “box”. However, these deficiencies are short-term problems until a new CTC TDA structure validates the training requirements of UE-x participation. The process currently takes four to five years to come to fruition.<sup>59</sup>

The true challenge in convincing the CTCs to accept UE-x TACs into rotations as players is the ongoing issue over funding related with the Joint National Training Capability (JNTC). Introduced to Congress on March 18, 2004, the intent over JNTC is to better train the services in joint operations. JNTC seeks to incorporate and connect all of the services’ major training centers, test ranges, and battle labs into joint training events. Focusing on both horizontal training (unit-unit) and vertical (HQ-unit) training, the Joint Forces Command (JFCOM) has found a “gem of a resource.”<sup>60</sup> Congress also agreed with the concept and provided JNTC a significant increase in funding to further promote experimentation.

With JFCOM having an increased allocation of training funds, the CTCs and BCTP have been developing innovative ways to get some of these funds. Unfortunately, this priority of effort has drawn away the attention to the idea of the UE-x sending their CPs to the dirt training centers. NTC and JRTC, knowing that their O/C manning is currently under strength, are very careful in not committing to UE-x CPs as players. This refusal to support effectively blocks any opportunities for vertical training funds from JFCOM. Therefore, the approach allows the CTCs to gain access to additional funds by requesting JFCOM for infrastructure improvements, like

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<sup>59</sup> Department of the Army, *Army Regulation 220-5: Designation, Classification, and Change in Status of Units*. Washington, D.C.: 15 April 2003. AR 220-5 states the process takes 2 years for a TDA to change its structure. In a conversation with a desk officer of CTCD at Ft. Leavenworth, the demands of GWOT has delayed the process even further. 4-5 years is the planning estimate that the directorate is using to gauge how long for a TDA change to formally occur.

<sup>60</sup> Dr. Paul W. Mayberry, Deputy Under Secretary of Defense (Readiness): “Joint National Training Capability”. Statement to U.S. House of Representatives Armed Services Committee, 18 March 2004

additional secure communication drops, to improve the ability to participate in the future JNTC events.<sup>61</sup>

BCTP, being the only organization available to O/C TACs, also has an opportunity to abandon its tactical training role with the JNTC concept. Horizontal training events are easier for JFCOM to conduct since the events usually stayed at the operational and strategic levels. BCTP realizes by converting the traditional WFX into a regular participant in JNTC ensures the survival and relevance of the digital CTC organization for the foreseeable future.

Conceding that these courses of action counter UBET's vision, they are probably infeasible for BCTP and the dirt CTCs. Currently, the UE-x's joint manning is not robust enough to justify lead participation in a JNTC exercise. This deficiency constrains the CTCs to UBET's benefit. In order to join JNTC exercises, the CTCs must plug in traditional rotations.<sup>62</sup>

## **Self-Development Proposal**

The final proposal of UBET is a two-phase certification process for the UE-x CPs. One phase is an individual certification for assignment to a respective CP based off the Air Force Space Command training certification model. The other is a collective certification similar to the Marines' pre-deployment training program, discussed earlier in the monograph. Both phases are used to validate the UE-x interaction with the MEL4 institutions and ensure mission readiness of the UE-x TACs.

The US Air Force Space Command operates a Mission Ready (MR) policy for all personnel who exercise command and control of any operational system or operations center

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<sup>61</sup> Major General Gordon C. Nash, USMC, Commander, Joint Warfighting Center and Director for Joint Training, USJFCOM: "Joint National Training Capability". Statement to U.S. House of Representatives Armed Services Committee, 18 March 2004.

<sup>62</sup> LTG William S. Wallace, BG Timothy D. Livsey, LTC Richard A. Totleben, U.S. Army; "A Joint Context for Training at the Combat Training Centers", *Military Review*, Sept-Oct 2004, 4-11. Following the CSA's guidance to "nest" the CTC program with JNTC, each CTC rotation should expect to participate. This expectation gives the UE-x leadership a bargaining chip to include TAC participation.

within its structure must be certified before performing unsupervised duty.<sup>63</sup> This requirement relates two key tasks to the assigned individual. First, the individual must complete an appropriate Initial Qualification Training (IQT) for the duty position. Second, once training is complete, the individual must pass an internal evaluation designated by the commander. The content of the examination is at the discretion of the unit.<sup>64</sup> Additionally, periodic re-certification is required on yearly or quarterly basis.

IQT applies to officer down to airman on battle staff positions. If an individual cannot achieve the requirements of his or her command post position, the individual is placed on a restricted status. Restricted status means the individual cannot perform duties unsupervised until the passing of the evaluation, performing re-training, or re-assignment. This approach gives incentive to the individual and command post team to get everyone assigned to the minimum skill level.

This policy appears to be a more technical oriented version of the Army's old Soldier Qualification Testing (SQT) program. The program was a useful tool for the commander to help visualize and measure the individual development of assigned personnel in a given duty position. The test was not intended to be the deciding factor for a job assignment, however it was a reliable gauge in determining what are soldiers' interest in duty related self-development. In 1990, the Army abandoned its SQT program due to downsizing the force and the costs for maintenance and implementation. As of October 2004, the Army G1 requested the U.S. Army Research Institute for Behavioral and Social Sciences to develop a new prototype SQT.<sup>65</sup>

UBET seeks a balance between the IQT and SQT for the personnel assigned to a UE-x Command Post. This proposal recommends that the UE-x Chief of Staff should have some type of metric tool to evaluate and certify incoming battle staff officers' qualifications for performance

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<sup>63</sup> United States Air Force, Air Force Space Command Instructions 10-20701V2, AFSPC Command Post – Operations Training Certification. 30 June 2002, 1-27.

<sup>64</sup> Ibid, 3.

<sup>65</sup> Roy C. Campbell and Dierdre J. Knapp, U.S. Army Research Institute, "ARI Special Report 52: Selection for Leadership: Transforming NCO Promotion", August 2002.

of a duty position within a CP. The metric tool also tailors to specific UE-x expected requirements and can serve as one of the capstone events in AOWC. In a snapshot, the command group can determine who is tracking the basic knowledge requirements of the UE-x and who is not. In this aspect, the mix of an IQT/SQT for the UE-x command posts personnel would set the conditions for a successful collective certification.

UBET collective certification of a UE-x command post will follow a modified Marine MEU model concerning the designation “Special Operations Capable”.<sup>66</sup> Typically, the MEF Commander designates tasks to be completed for certification while the MEF headquarters provides a team of O/Cs to ensure compliance in meeting the standards. For the UE-x validation, the designated Combatant Commander will determine what critical training tasks for the UE-x must be complete. Once identified, two organizations will assist the UE-x Commander in meeting these requirements. BCTP will be lead for tactical requirements while JFCOM will support operational and strategic tasks.

Currently, JFCOM does not have a dedicated organization to fill in as a certifying body for the UE-x CPs. However, there are some feasible candidates. Among elements like the Joint National Training Capability (JNTC), Joint Training Directorate and Joint Warfighting Center (J7/JWFC) and Standing Joint Force Headquarters Core Element (SJFHQ), the capability exists for JFCOM to take the lead in training and certifying UE-x command posts for joint operations.<sup>67</sup>

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<sup>66</sup> U.S. Marine Corps, Marine Corps Order 3502.3, “MEU (SOC) Pre-deployment Training Program”, Washington, D.C. 7 July 1995. Certification remains as the cornerstone for training a Marine Command Element at every level. Marine Corps Order 3502.3, the MEU (SOC) Pre-deployment Training Program (commonly referred to as the PTP) is an example of the certification process that has applications for a training program for a UE-x command post. The PTP focuses training on three major tenets of operations: stabilization of both personnel and equipment, standardization in training and procedures, and integration of the Command Element and its subordinate units into whatever higher organization it is working for.

<sup>67</sup> Major General Gordon C. Nash, USMC, Commander, Joint Warfighting Center and Director for Joint Training, USJFCOM: “Joint National Training Capability”. Statement to U.S. House of Representatives Armed Services Committee, 18 March 2004

## Selected DOTMLP-F Implications

The UE-x Battlestaff Expeditionary Training proposals have some significant implications for TRADOC, HRC, and JFCOM departments of responsibility. Primarily in the areas of organization, training, leadership, and personnel of DOTMLP-F, these recommended changes are cost effective adaptations, designed to assist the UE-x Commander's ability to train and tailor the command posts for success in building cohesion. Military adaptations have usually been influenced by several external factors. They include time available, cultural norms, geography, historical experience, political institutions, and resource availability.<sup>68</sup> Clearly due to ongoing operations, the principal driving factors for UE-x conversion, whether it is the command posts or the BCTs, remains time and resources. This point is reinforced as UBET's approach seems to be in-step with what Brigadier General Timothy D. Livsey, head of the Combined Arms Center-Training task force, is also looking for in terms of training proposals with realistic implementation expectations. "There are no bad training ideas out there, but there's a finite amount of dollars"<sup>69</sup>.

## Organization

The two nearly identical command posts of the UE-x formation along with the main and the mobile command group are designed and sized to be able to efficiently deploy and conduct full spectrum operations. The UE-x structure created a special troops battalion to ensure that these elements have enough organic support, in terms of personnel and equipment, to perform these capabilities. There are some downsides with right-sized organizations. For example, the UE-x command posts can be highly sensitive to the common disruptions within the personnel assignment and replacement system. This sensitivity is based on the fact that the command posts have a limited redundancy in the number and experience level of its primary battle staff officers.

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<sup>68</sup> Harold R. Winton and David R. Mets, *The Challenge of Change*, University of Nebraska, Lincoln, NE, 2000; pg xiii.

<sup>69</sup> Gary Sheftick, "Focus task force linking Joint virtual training to 'box'", Army News Service: Washington, D.C., May 11, 2004.

Any incident or issue that would make these designated personnel non-deployable would force the UE-x chief of staff to create ad hoc command posts by shifting personnel to fill the holes.

UBET recognizes the nature of the operating environment for right-sized organizations and pools its human resources to counter the negative effects. By adopting a proactive farm-club interaction with MEL4 institutions, the UE-x CPs can reasonably be assured that UE-x specific proficient battle staff officers will man it. Therefore, no matter the numbers of battle staff officers that are assigned in a given personnel cycle, there should not be a drop in experience and capability.

## **Training**

The Combat Training Centers have been the driving mechanism for the Army's collective training strategy and culture since their inception.<sup>70</sup> It is critical for UBET's implementation and acceptance that the CTCs agree and support the concept that the UE-x TACs should be allowed to participate as a full up player in a training rotation. Having one or two BCTs working directly for a UE-x TAC during a "dirt" CTC training rotation promotes and develops rapid integration skills with battle staff. Additionally, the resource drain typically associated with a tasking to run a CTC higher headquarters control cell (HICON) would not longer be required.

There has been some buy-in to this idea. TRADOC has identified several potential training scenarios that would allow a UE-x to replace the traditional common scenario units; 52d Mechanized, 21<sup>st</sup> Infantry Division, 10<sup>th</sup> Corps used in the CTC training rotations.<sup>71</sup> The only limitation is that currently the CTCs can not provide the level of quality in training assistance for a TAC participation usually expected from the Army training centers. Until this limitation is addressed, the default is to allow BCTP to develop workable compromises with the UE-x formations.

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<sup>70</sup> LTG William S. Wallace, BG Timothy D. Livsey, LTC Richard A. Tottleben; "A Joint Context for Training at the Combat Training Centers", *Military Review*, Sept-Oct 2004, pg 4-11.

<sup>71</sup> Ibid, pg 7

Trends and pressures continue to appear within division staffs converting to UE-x formations that the virtual capstone event associated with BCTP might no longer be acceptable for validating the UE-x command posts. This is primarily due to the limitations of adding battlefield complexity to the simulations used.<sup>72</sup> The need for a live training event to certify the battle staffs will be high demand.

## **Leadership**

Some military organization experts believe the UE-x concept is not a radical enough design to promote the development of more effective and efficient command and control systems within the UE-x formation.<sup>73</sup> UBET answers this concern by suggesting a robust certification program during the academic school year and assignment in the UE-x. A closely monitored examination program for both individual and collective skills would bring greater rigor to the UE-x command posts.<sup>74</sup> This recommendation will have its leadership challenges. As the command decides whether to use the skills test to reinforce its developmental aspects or use it as a strictly evaluation tool, there has to be buy-in on the process.

## **Personnel**

UBET proposals places more demands on the Human Resource Command to streamline the assignment process for MEL4 qualified majors. If HRC fails to meet the ninety-five percent solution on assignments by December or January of every academic year, the UE-x commander may lose some training opportunities that are incorporated into the adjusted AOWC phase of the school year. From personal observation, the current rotation of preference statements, interviews, and branch visits to MEL4 qualifying schools are becoming relatively efficient and timely. The root cause of most delays in the assignment process still remains at the Department of the Army

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<sup>72</sup> COL (Ret.) Gregory Fontenot, *On Point: The United States Army in Operation Iraqi Freedom*, Office of Chief of Staff, U.S. Army, Washington, D.C., 2004, 15.

<sup>73</sup> James Jay Carafano, Ph.D., "The Army Goes Rolling Along: New Service Transformation Agenda Suggests Promise and Problems", The Heritage Foundation, Washington, D.C., February 23, 2004.

<sup>74</sup> Douglas A. Macgregor, *Breaking the Phalanx*, Praeger Publishers, Westport, CT, 1997, pg 168.

level. The assignment validation process is very fluid due to constant daily evaluation of personnel needs for the total active Army.

Another potential personnel opportunity for the UE-x commander is tapping into the Army graduates of the Joint Advanced Warfighting School located at Newport News, Virginia. JAWS is currently envisioned to provide joint qualified officers to man assignments on the Joint Staff and Combatant commands.<sup>75</sup> The attending MEL4 Army officers, all are below the zone selectees, (Major/O-4 level) have three years within an UE-x to get branch qualified before utilization. This is an excellent opportunity to add a joint operation specialist to the UE-x battle staff. A JAWS graduate is ideal to either lead the UE-x joint liaison section or serve as an additional operations planner similar to SAMS graduates.

## Summary

The UE-x Battlestaff Expeditionary Training program (UBET) incorporates three proposals to promote rapid integration and cohesion within the battle staff. First, the adoption of a farm club relationship with incoming personnel, through measured use, creates more stability in the command posts. Through increasing the interaction with MEL4 U.S. Army schools, the UE-x will be able to rapidly integrate future battle staff officers as they are molded by the preferences of the gaining UE-x. Second, organizational cohesion in the battle staff and vertical cohesion<sup>76</sup> with its subordinate units is improved by sending a UE-x TAC to a “dirt” CTC rotation. The experiences gained by being participating on the ground at a training center normally outweigh a digital training event. The third and final proposal is certification. UBET presents a way of addressing the need of having proficient battle staff officers. Competent battle staff officers multiply the effects of cohesion on command posts. Majors being knowledgeable prior and

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<sup>75</sup> Robert A. Doughty, “Reforming Joint Doctrine”, *Parameters*, vol. 22, no.3 (Autumn 1992)

<sup>76</sup> Major Brendan B. McBreen, “The Strength of the Wolf is the Pack”, *Marine Corps Gazette*, February 2004, 47. There are four types of cohesion. Horizontal Cohesion is trust among peers. Vertical Cohesion is bonding between subordinates and leaders. These types of cohesion apply only to small groups with face-to-face relationships. Organizational Cohesion is the relationship of an individual to his organization. Societal Cohesion is how a military relates to society.

during assignment to the UE-x facilitate the ability to rapidly integrate current and incoming members of the team.

This chapter provides the groundwork for a potentially effective UE-x training program. The selective DOTMLP-F analysis of organization, training, leadership, and personnel suggest that UBET is feasible. The findings also identify that coordination and agreement with TRADOC, HRC and JFCOM are key to full implementation. If resourced to its full potential, UBET can grow a significant level of cohesion within the UE-x and its command posts.<sup>77</sup>

## CHAPTER FIVE

### CONCLUSION

The *Army Campaign Plan* that directs the conversion of division structures into UE-x formations implies a need for a fundamental change in how the Army organizes and executes training for its command posts. From the analysis provided in this paper, the operational environment and the Army Force Generation policy has provided an opportunity for the UE-x commander to formulate and implement a new comprehensive training program that promotes a rapidly integrated and cohesive battle staff. This paper proposes the creation of the UE-x Battlestaff Expeditionary Training program (UBET) to balance the innovation required to adapt with ARFORGEN and shape battle staff training to suit the operational environment.

The operational environment, which includes UE-x conversion for the divisions and stability and reconstruction efforts in Bosnia, Kosovo, Afghanistan and Iraq, continues to be demanding and problematic for command post training. One-year troop deployments and divisions available have put a premium on the critical training months between personnel rotation of the battle staff and the actual deployment of the UE-x or legacy division to an area of operations. This open window for training can range from three to six months. The limited time

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<sup>77</sup> Ibid, 48.

available is a motivation for UE-x leadership to find ways in creating more “white space” for their battle staff training programs.

The Army Force Generation policy emphasizes the stabilization of the brigade combat teams into a predictable three-year management cycle. Unfortunately, the policy does not formally address a life cycle for the UE-x formation. Therefore, the potential is present for the UE-x commander and battle staff to have some latitude for exploring options in developing cohesion in the command posts. The most viable option continues to be the maximizing a cyclic life cycle, which is dependant on trends of personnel assignments of battle staff officers to the UE-x.

The U.S. Army is in the midst of major combat operations and demanding operational requirements. Regardless of the operational environment, the U.S. Army is moving forward in conducting the conversion of legacy divisions to UE-x formations. It is the systematic, large-scale reorganization across the entire spectrum of the DOTMLPF. This is also the opportune time to implement changes in battle staff training. By working concurrently with the Army Campaign plan and some innovation, the UE-x can still develop cohesion within its battle staff.

## **Recommendations**

The UE-x Battlestaff Expeditionary Training Program (UBET) takes in consideration the current operational environment, which includes limited training time between operational rotations, and makes recommendations that have limited impacts on current Army operational and institutional structures. UBET stays within current training doctrine by presenting its recommendations in an operational, institutional and self-development format.

The operational recommendation is to simply to send a UE-x TAC to a “dirt” CTC rotation for its capstone-training event (CERTEX/MRX). In the best case, UE-x CPs would actively participate as a player unit in training rotations at NTC or JRTC. BCTP continues to serve as the lead training organization, however, it would also be in a reinforcing role to the dirt

CTCs. The event would signify a shift in training methodology from an emphasis on the BCTP WFX (virtual training) to command posts learning how to deploy and interact with units on the ground (live training). Currently, the CTCs have funding and manning issues that prevent full implementation of this concept. However, a near term fix is for the CTCs to allow the deployment of TACs to a training rotation as HICON to allow some training to occur.

The institutional recommendation is founded around the premise of finding more time on the calendar to train officers to be able to form functional and cohesive battlestaffs for the UE-x formations. UBET answers this issue by reorienting the second half of the Army's MEL4 schools academic year to focus on training future UE-x staff officers on their specific organizations. Every exercise in the schoolhouse will have some current and relevant linkage with the UE-x of their next assignment. In short, UBET builds a functional and cohesive UE-x Battlestaff before the personnel PCS to their assignments in the actual UE-x.

The third recommendation is a self-developmental proposal centered on a robust certification for both the individual staff officer and the command post as a collective group. Traditionally, the Army has not been a strong advocate for utilizing an assessment process or tool. This limited exposure is based off the Army's track record with the SQT program that was abandoned in 1990. UBET recommends bringing back some type of evaluation tool that will facilitate the assignment process within the UE-x CPs. For collective certification, UBET outlines the responsibility should remain with BCTP for tactical certification, while JFCOM should augment its SJFHQ element to serve as the clearing house for operational and strategic certification. Namely, JFCOM ensures that UE-x command posts are mission ready and configured to best support the designated Combatant Commander.

The Army should adopt the recommendations from the UBET program. As the Army is extremely engaged with operations in Iraq and Afghanistan, it is logical that the divisions converting to UE-x formations should use some type of standardized training template for their command posts to maximize its ever-decreasing homestation training time. By having UE-x

formations operating off the same milestones for the training of its C2 structures, the demand will force some near-term structural changes in the CTCs and at JFCOM.

These immediate changes will have positive effects throughout UE-x organizations in the Army. UBET provides the focus and flexibility needed to allow C2 structures to become more efficient and effective in the current fight. Additionally, UBET sets the conditions within the Army's training culture and methodology to allow even more significant changes to occur once the Army's operational tempo slows down. Better rapport will already be established between operators and military education institutions as both elements will have to communicate effectively to maximize UBET.

In order to meet the Army Chief of Staff's intent for the UE-x command posts and sustaining the current fight, a decision point has already arrived. The operational Army is looking for "just-in-time" training approaches to address its needs, while the institutional Army is trying to adapt to better support. UBET provides a feasible approach in training UE-x command posts that answers the mail for both requirements. With four divisions already converted, the call on training the UE-x CPs has to be made.

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